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Abstract 
 
Contrary to what is implied by the so called “Washington consensus”, Stiglitz (2003) has argued 
that in the least developed countries border taxes are superior to VAT. However, supported by 
much respectable research, the IMF and World Bank’s recommend that developing countries 
substitute VAT for border taxes. The present paper provides an easy to implement parameterised 
general equilibrium model which may be used as the basis for empirical research, required to reach 
a consensus opinion within the profession on the issue. The model allows for the fact that different 
tax systems are associated with different administrative costs, and represents the informal sector as 
a parameterisation, the CES-UT, of a utility function with explicit representation of the use of time. 
By means of a quantitative example, it illustrates, on the one hand, that a large informal sector in 
itself does not justify the use of border taxes, but, on the other hand, when administrative costs of 
taxation are taken into account, that the size of the informal sector, as claimed by Stiglitz (2003), is 
indeed important for whether the use of border taxes is desirable or not. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How to tackle underdevelopment in poor parts of the world is one of the most pressing challenges in 
economics today. In this context, the desirability of free trade, a treasured tenet of many economists, 
has in recent years come under attack. Prominently Stiglitz (2003) has implied that substituting VAT 
for border taxes is likely to reduce rather than improve social welfare. However, a highly influential 
body of research1 has provided academic support for the IMF and World Bank recommendation for 
developing countries to use VAT rather than border taxes to raise government revenue. Yet the basis 
for the disagreement has remained elusive.  Emran and Stiglitz’ (2005) suggests that the key problem 
with the literature supporting the use of VAT in developing countries is that it neglects that these 
countries have large informal sectors. However, within what he admits is a restrictive model Keen 
(2006) shows that given an optimal VAT system a large informal sector in itself provides no 
justification for diversions from free trade. He further argues that the reason why Emran and Stiglitz 
(2005) reach another conclusion is that their model assumes that the informal sector is reimbursed for 
VAT paid on purchases of intermediate inputs, which does not seem to correspond to how VAT 
works in any country. 
Governments in developing countries tend to finance a great part of their expenditures by border 
taxes. Whether developing countries benefit from the use of border taxes is thus an important policy 
issue with obvious relevance for policy makers in these countries, but also for policy makers in 
developed countries who in international and bilateral negotiations on trade and assistance tend to put 
pressure on developing countries to liberalise their economies in return for market access. It is thus a 
question of considerable importance whether policy-makers should be guided by the 
recommendations of Emran and Stiglitz or by those of the Bretton-Woods sister organisations. 
The contribution of this paper is, firstly, to clarify why Emran and Stiglitz (2005) and Keen (2006, 
2007) reach different conclusions while relying on what is essentially the same theory of optimal 
taxation, and, secondly, to contribute a parameterised theoretical model, which is relatively easy to 
implement empirically and thus might be useful in trying to reach a consensus opinion on the issue.  
In the process we provide insight into why, due to problematic separability assumptions, simulations 
results based on the use of standard CGE models have misrepresented the cost of a differentiated tax 
and tariff structure in developing countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up a theoretical general equilibrium model 
which allows (i) the representation of a VAT to be different from a system of consumer taxes (by 
allowing for intermediate consumption), (ii) the representation of informal sector production by the 
use of a utility function with the explicit presentation of the use of time, and (iii) for the fact that 
                                                 
1 See Ebrill et al. (2001), and references herein. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the book reflects the official view of 
the IMF. 
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different tax structures are associated with different levels of administrative costs.  In Section 3, we 
review the theoretical arguments for whether it is desirable for developing countries to use  border 
taxes to raise government revenue. In Section 4, we specify a stylized CGE model, which uses a 
CES-UT parameterisation of the informal sector consistent with how household behaviour is 
represented in the theoretical model. We calculate the amounts of administrative costs associated 
with a VAT which would justify diversions from free trade based on this model. A final section 
summaries and concludes the paper. 
 
2. The general equilibrium setting with explicit representation of 
production in the informal sector 
 
Extending the theoretical model used in Munk (2004) with the representation of intermediate 
consumption (without which a VAT is equivalent to a system of consumer taxes), we specify a 
general equilibrium model of a small open economy with three perfectly competitive production 
sectors, one representative household, and a government. In the economy there is one domestically 
traded primary factor, indexed 0, and three internationally traded commodities, indexed 1, 2 and 3. 
The government imposes border taxes, Wt ≡( )2 3W W W1t ,t ,t ,  household taxes,  t = ( )0 1 2 3, ,t t ,t t , and 
sector specific taxes on intermediate inputs, it ≡( )2 3i i i1t ,t ,t , i=1,2,3. Exogenously given world market 
prices are ( )1 2 3,W W W Wp , p p≡p , market prices ( )0 1 2 3, ,p p , p p≡p = ( )0 1 1 2 2 3 3, ,W W W W W Wp p t p t , p t+ + + , 
household prices ( )0 1 2 3,q ,q q ,q≡q = ( )0 0 1 1 2 2 3 3, ,p t , p t p t p t+ + + +  and sector specific producer 
prices for intermediate inputs ( ) ( )1 2 3 1 1 2 2 3 3, , ,i i i i i i ip , p p p t p t p t≡ = + + +p  , i=1,2,3. The economy is 
assumed to have the potential to produce any of the three commodities using the primary factor and 
intermediate inputs of produced commodities. The production in the formal sector exhibits constant 
returns to scale with ( )0 1 2 3, ,i i i ic p p , p p  being the unit cost of producing commodity i. Hence, the 
economy will specialise in the production of one commodity, which thus becomes the export good, 
while the two other commodities become import goods. The output of the export sector is ky , the use 
of the primary factor for its production 0v , and the use of intermediate inputs , 1,2,3iv i = 2.  
                                                 
2 The sign conventions are: 1 0 y > and ( ), 0,1, 2, 30iv i => ; 0 0 x < and ( )i 0 i=1,2,3x > ; Wk 0y < and 
( )0,  1, 2, 3Wiy i k> ≠ = ,. Thus for the primary factor tax and the export tax, respectively, to generate a positive tax 
revenue, the tax rates must be negative. 
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The household's endowment of the primary factor is represented by 0ω , and its net demand vector by 
( )0 1 2 3, , ,x x x x . The household's untaxed consumption of the primary factor is thus 0 0xω + . Foreign 
trade (net imports) is ( )1 2 3,  , W W Wy y y , and the government's resource requirement Gix , 0,1, 2,3i = . 
The condition of profit maximisation is for sector k, the export sector, is that 
 ( )0 1 2 3, ,k k k ki kk
i
cv p p , p p y
p
∂= ∂    0,1, 2,3i =   (1) 
 ( )0 1 2 3, ,k k k kkp c p p , p p=     (2) 
and for other sectors, that 
 ( )0 1 2 3, ,i i i iip c p p , p p<   1, 2,3i k≠ =   (3) 
The balance of trade constraint is  
 
 i 1,2,3
W W
i ip y
=
∑ =0    (4) 
The government's budget constraint is  
 
 i=0,1,2,3  i=1,2,3  i=1,2,3  i=0,1,2,3
 0k W W Gi i i i i i i it x t v t y p x+ + − =∑ ∑ ∑ ∑    (5) 
Material balance requires 
   0  G0 0 0v x  x= + +      (6)  
   +  W Gk k k k ky y v x x+ = +     (7) 
   W Gi i i iy v x x= + +   1, 2,3i k≠ =    (8) 
Had we represented household preferences by a standard utility function, ( )0 1 2 3, , ,u x x x x , then we 
would have expressed the condition for ( )0 1 2 3, , ,x x x x  to be consistent with the utility maximising 
condition for general equilibrium by 
 ( ), 0E u =q  
 ( ),i ix E u= q  0,1, 2,3i =    (9) 
However, we add structure to the model by expressing this condition based on a utility function with 
explicit representation of time, ( ) ( ) ( )( )0 1 2 30 1 1 0 2 2 0 3 3 0, , , , , ,U c C x c C x c C x c , where 00 0 0 0
1,2,3
i
i
c c xω
=
= − −∑
is pure leisure, 0( , )
i
i i iC C x c= , i=1,2,3 concave functions representing how the purchases of 
produced commodities, ,  1,2,3ix i =  are combined with the time, 0 ,  1,2,3ic i = , to produce goods iC , 
i=1,2,3, which are traded and consumed only within the household sector. The utility function, 
( )00 1 2 3, , ,U c C C C , defined on consumption of the three commodities, iC , i=1,2,3, and is assumed 
to have standard properties. The corresponding expenditure function 
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( ) ( )
0
0 1 2 3 0 0 0 1 N
, ; , C
, , , , Min  , ,.., . . =
i
i ii FC ic C
E q Q Q Q u q c Q C U c C Cs t u
∈ ∈
⎧ ⎫≡ +⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∑? , where, iQ , i=1,2,3, are the 
prices of iC , i=1,2,3, therefore also have standard properties. 
We define the informal sector as the production and consumption of the goods iC , i=1,2,3. 
Informality thus involves that production and consumption, as well as transactions within the 
household sector, are not subject to taxation3. Profit in the informal sector is 
( ) ( )0 1 2 3 , 1,2,3 0
1,2,3 1,2,3
, , , , ,
i
i
C i i i i i
i i
q q q q Max Q C G q q C=
= =
Π ≡ −∑ ∑ , i=1,2,3, where ( )0 , ,i i iG q q C , i=1,2,3 
indicate the costs associated with informal sector production. 
With this representation of the informal sector, the conditions for ( )0 1 2 3, , ,x x x x  to be consistent with 
the utility maximising condition for general equilibrium we thus express by 
( )0 1 2 3 0 0, , , ,E q Q Q Q u q ω−? = ( )0 1 2 3, , ,q q q qΠ  (10) 
 ( ) ( )0 0, , , ,i iii C i i i i
i
GQ G q q C q q C
C
∂= ≡ ∂   i=1,2,3 (11) 
 ( ) ( )0 0, , , ,iii i i i i i
i
Gx G q q C q q C
q
∂= ≡ ∂   i=1,2,3 (12) 
 ( ) ( )0 0 0 0
0
, , , ,
i
i i
i i i i
Gc G q q C q q C
q
∂= ≡ ∂   i=1,2,3 (13) 
0
0 0 0 0
(1,2,3)
i
i
x c c ω
∈
= + −∑   (14) 
 
As the informal sector is represented by adding structure to a standard utility function, the model 
specified so far is consistent with the standard Diamond and Mirrlees framework for optimal tax 
analysis, as explained in Munk (2008) with reference to Atkinson and Stern (1980, 1981). Standard 
theoretical results of optimal taxation, notably the Diamond and Mirrlees Production Efficiency 
Theorem therefore apply. 
The development of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) framework for optimal tax analysis was 
motivated by the observation that it is administratively infeasible to achieve government objectives 
of income distribution and revenue generation by the use of lump sum taxes. It is seems almost 
equally unrealistic to assume that systems of commodity taxation are not associated with any costs. 
From the outset it was pointed out by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), and later elaborated by Munk 
(1980) using a dual approach, that when all market transaction cannot be taxed at their optimal level, 
                                                 
3 Our notion of informality thus differs from the notion of a black economy where agents evade taxation. As pointed out 
by Pierre Pestieau at the IIPF 2007, where papers of Boadway and Sato (2007) and Dreher, Méon and Schneider (2007) 
were also presented, in many European countries at the middle of the 20th century, large part of the agricultural sector, 
with up to 50% of total employment, was exempt from taxation and by this definitions could be described as an informal 
sector. It seems that today a large part of the agricultural sector in many developing countries equally can be 
characterised in this way. 
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the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) Production Efficiency Theorem does not apply with the 
implication that in the real world production efficiency and free trade may not be desirable. 
Nevertheless, the maintained assumption in subsequent contributions to optimal tax analysis has 
almost without exception been based on models where all market transactions can be taxed by the 
government at no costs. It is however generally recognised that for the design of optimal tax systems 
administrative costs are important4. We therefore choose to divert from the standard Diamond and 
Mirrlees (1971) framework by modifying the model by assuming that different tax structures are 
associated with different administrative costs5. We assume that the government’s resource 
requirement depends on the tax system, ( )W,  , =1,2,3,  i i≡τ t t t , rather than being exogenously 
given. To make precise this notion, we extend the definition of a tax structure employed in Munk 
(2004) to include also taxes on intermediate inputs and assume that the government's choice of a tax-
tariff system, ( )* * * *, , =1,2,3, i Wi≡τ t t t , is constrained to be an element in the set of tax-tariff 
structures, ,j jΞ ∈F , where each tax structure j is defined by restrictions imposed on the tax 
instruments available to the government, and where the administrative costs for all tax-tariff systems 
belonging to a given tax-tariff structure j are ( )B j . Since we assume the government’s resource 
requirement for other expenditures than for tax administration as exogenously given, the 
government's total resource requirement is thus 
  ( )iG Gix x j=  0,1, 2,3i =    (15) 
where j is endogenous to the government’s problem of maximising social welfare and thus depend on 
the level of administrative costs associated with the different tax structures associated considered by 
the government. 
 
3. Review of the rationale for the use of VAT and border taxes to raise 
government revenue 
 
In this section, we based on standard optimal tax theory review the justification for to use of border 
taxes, either as the sole source of government revenue or as a supplement to a VAT system. 
The Diamond and Mirrlees’ Production Efficiency Theorem says that although lump-sum taxation is 
not feasible, optimal taxation requires production efficiency. It therefore follows directly from this 
theorem that in economy which may be represented by the general equilibrium conditions (1) to (14) 
                                                 
4 Ebrill et al. (2001) in the Preface at p xii, p75 and in Chapter 16 stress the importance of taking administrative concerns 
into account. Although they do not explicitly represent such costs in their model, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) also put great 
emphasis on the importance of administrative costs for tax design in developing countries. 
5 Administrative costs include both the costs of tax collections and the cost of tax compliance of private agents, which 
here for convenience is assumed reimbursed by the government. This may not be a realistic assumption, but of little 
consequence for the issue at hand, whether the use of border taxes is desirable in developing countries. 
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if all market transactions can be taxed at no costs, then production efficiency and thus free trade is 
desirable. Furthermore, as for  =0it , i=1,2,3, the whole system of equations  is homogenous of 
degree zero in consumer prices, ( )0 1 2 3,q ,q q ,q≡q , and in producer prices, ( )0 1 2 3, ,p p , p p≡p , the 
domestic consumption of one commodity and the border transactions in one commodity can be 
assumed untaxed without loss of generality, for example by assuming that the export good is untaxed 
at the border and that the supply of labour to the market is untaxed, i.e. that k 0
Wt =  and 0 0t =  (cf. 
Munk 2004). We have assumed that production in the informal sector take place under constant 
returns to scale and therefore is associated with no profit; had we alternatively assumed that 
production in the formal sector was associated with decreasing returns to scale and thus profit, then 
the optimal solution in the absence of a 100% tax on profit would involve the value of the profit to 
the household to be wiped out by the level of consumer prices being set infinitely higher than the 
level of producer prices (cf. Munk 1978 and 1980)6. One might therefore expect that a similar result 
would obtain in the presence of untaxed profit in informal sector. However, as we have seen, this is 
not the case. The reason is that the government is not able to influence the value of the profit in the 
informal sector by manipulating the level of consumer prices relative to producer prices, as the 
informal sector profit is homogenous of degree 1 in consumer prices (cf. Munk 2008). Therefore, 
whether or not informal sector production is associated with profit, when all transactions in the 
formal economy can taxed at no cost, then there is no justification for the use of border taxes. 
Furthermore, it has been widely accepted in the literature, that a progressive income tax combined 
with a VAT at a uniform rate without the use of border taxes is the best system of taxation in 
developed countries. This position has found its justification mainly based on two arguments. First, 
that with a progressive income tax the scope for increasing social welfare by a differentiated system 
of commodity taxation is small compared with the administrative costs involved; and second, that the 
use of border taxes will introduce production inefficiency. The first argument is often justified with 
reference to Atkinson and Stiglitz (1978), who in a simplified model show that there is no need for 
differentiated commodity taxation with an optimal income tax. The second argument refers to the 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) Production Efficiency Theorem, mentioned above. 
However, there is also a consensus opinion in the profession supported by research by the IMF and 
the World bank (cf. Ebrill et al 2001), that taxation in developing countries is associated with high 
administrative costs, making it de facto impossible to raise tax revenue by income taxation, and also 
very costly to differentiate VAT rates. The IMF and World Bank recommendations with respect to 
                                                 
6 It is therefore not possible without loss of generality in a model with untaxed profit in the formal sector to assume one 
commodity untaxed. One can naturally as Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1971), and as Boadway and Sato (2007) assume that one 
commodity cannot be taxed as a restriction on the government’s problem of maximising social welfare, but a justification 
would then be required for why it is realistic to assume that the government’s choice of tax instruments is subject to this 
restriction (cf. Munk 1980). 
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taxation in developing countries to implement a VAT at uniform rate7 without the use of border taxes 
may therefore be seen as the application of what is widely considered a reasonable system of taxation 
for developed countries. 
But, as pointed out by Stiglitz (2003), there are important differences between developed and less 
developed countries which need to be taken into account in providing policy advice on taxation. As 
emphasised by Emran and Stiglitz (2007), and also recognised in Ebrill et al (2001, p71), the fact, 
that developing countries cannot raise a significant amount of tax revenue by income taxation, means 
that the insight by Atkinson and Stiglitz (1978) cannot be used to provide a rationale for the 
application in developing countries of a VAT at uniform rate. However with a VAT at uniform rate, 
the Diamond-Mirrlees (1071) Production Efficiency Theorem cannot be used to justify that it is 
desirable to suppress border taxes. Furthermore, if a VAT at uniform rate is assumed superior to a 
VAT at differentiated rates due to the administrative costs involved, then, as Emran and Stiglitz 
(2005) point out, and as supported by the theoretical analysis in Munk (2004), the size of the formal 
sector plays an important role for whether the use of border taxes is desirable or not. 
It seems therefore that there is an inconsistency between, on the one hand, the World Bank and the 
IMF’s position with respect to the importance of administrative costs in developing countries, and, 
on the other hand, their position on the use of border taxes by these countries. If a differentiated VAT 
is considered desirable, then free trade is indeed also desirable, but if a VAT at uniform rate is 
desirable for administrative reasons, then the use of border taxes may also be desirable. 
However, the answer to the question of whether in practice it is desirable in developing countries to 
use border taxes to raise government revenue either without a VAT or to supplement a VAT depends 
not only on how one assesses the administrative costs associated with different tax-tariff structures, it 
also depends on how one defines VAT, and there has been some ambiguity in that respect. As 
emphasised by Keen (2006), in practice VAT is not, as in as in Munk (2004), only a tax on final 
consumption, even less a tax only on formal sector sales as in Pigout and Walley (2001) and in 
Emran and Stiglitz (2005). In general, a VAT exempt from taxation intermediate inputs used in the 
formal sector, but not purchases used for inputs in informal sector production. 
When a VAT, in line with what is the case in practice, within the framework of our model is defined 
as ( )W,  , =1,2,3,  i i≡τ t t t  where =0, =1,2,3i it , then as we have seen it follows directly from the 
Diamond and Mirrlees Production Efficiency theorem, that when taxes on final consumption may be 
differentiated between produced commodities at no cost, no improvement in welfare can be achieved 
neither by taxes on border transactions nor on the use of sector specific taxes on intermediate 
consumption whether or not informal production is associated with profit. If a VAT is defined in this 
                                                 
7 World Bank and the IMF for distributional reasons recommend zero rating for basic food stuff and taxation of certain 
luxury articles in addition to a uniform VAT. 
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way, and if it is assumed that VAT rates can be differentiated at no cost, Keen (2006, 2007) is 
therefore right that there is no justification for the use of border taxes whatever the size of the 
informal sector. It is an illustration of the benefits of embedding informal sector production in the 
household utility function, rather than representing it as a separate production sector, that we are able 
to reach the same conclusion as Keen (2006) just with reference to a general theorem of optimal 
taxation.  
In contrast, if taxation is assumed to be associated with administrative costs and depend how the tax 
rates are set, then the use of border taxes as the only source of government revenue or to supplement 
a VAT may be desirable. As established in Munk (1980), and in Munk (1998) with explicit reference 
to administrative costs, in the case of a closed economy, sector specific taxes on inputs creating 
production inefficiency may be justified, and in an open economy, as elaborated in Munk (2004), a 
case may be made for using border taxes to raise government revenue in particular in developing 
countries with large informal sector. 
Pigout and Whalley (2001) and Emran and Stiglitz (2005) in their models assume that neither the 
informal nor the informal sectors the consumption of intermediate inputs is subject to taxation. As 
this is equivalent in our framework to impose restrictions on household taxes, it is not surprising that 
with a VAT defined in this way, the use of border taxes may improve welfare. However, as pointed 
out by Keen (2006), in the case of real world VAT systems, VAT paid on the purchase of inputs used 
for informal production is not reimbursed in practice. 
However, as just mentioned in all cases where restrictions are imposed on VAT rates, as for example 
where VAT is levied at a uniform rate, i.e. where , 1, 2,3it T i= = , there may be a case for using 
border taxes. There may indeed also be a justification for using sector specific intermediate input 
taxes, *, =1,2,3i it . As pointed out by Keen (2006) such taxed are used in certain developing 
countries to discourage the use of resources in the informal sector. This issue has within a closed 
economy model been analysed in some length in Munk (1998). Although our present model provides 
an appropriate framework for extending this analysis to a small open economy, we will in order to 
maintain the focus on border taxes delay the analysis of how intermediate input taxes can be used to 
improve social welfare in developing countries for consideration in another context. 
 
4. The CES-UT parameterisation of household preferences and a 
quantitative illustration 
 
It is one thing theoretically to establish that administrative costs may justify diversions from free 
trade; it is another matter whether such costs do in fact justify the use of border taxes. There is still 
relative little empirical evidence available on the administrative costs associated with different tax 
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systems in developing countries, and the data required to fully specify general equilibrium models to 
represent developing country economies, are not readily available. There seems therefore not yet to 
be sufficient empirical evidence to conclusively settle the dispute on whether it is desirable or not for 
developing countries to use border taxes. 
However, we want here to approach an answer to the question by a quantitative example involving 
the use of a stylized CGE model. By constructing a stylized CGE model based on data representing a 
prototype developing country we put numbers to the theory with the objective to get a better idea of 
the potential importance of administrative costs for the choice of an optimal tax-tariff system. At this 
stage we therefore do not attempt to reach a conclusive answer to the question whether in developing 
countries border taxes are desirable or not, as this would require empirical evidence which is very 
difficult, if not impossible to obtain. We leave the task of gathering the relevant data, and of 
estimating the parameters of the model for future research, an important justification for the present 
effort being to provide guidance for such an endeavour.  
We consider a prototype developing country where the informal sector is large, as is manifestly the 
case in most developing countries, the formal part of the economy involves transaction in three 
produced commodities: Manufacturing (1), Cash crop (2) and Food (Formal sector) (3), all traded 
both domestically and internationally, and where at world market prices the economy is competitive 
in the production of Food (Formal sector), but not in Cash crop and in particular not in 
Manufacturing. Furthermore, we assume that Food (Formal sector) is a close substitute to Food 
(Informal sector). We represent the production technology of Food (Formal sector) by a CES unit 
cost function ( )3 31, ;0c p p s , where 3s is the elasticity of substitution between inputs of Labour and 
of Manufacturing, and  parameterised the cost function ( )1 0 1 1, ,G q q C  in the theoretical model by a 
CES cost function, ( )1 110 1 1, , ;G q q C σ , where 11σ  is the elasticity of substitution between time and 
Manufacturing in the production Food (Informal sector). 
We represent household behaviour, and thus the behaviour of the informal sector, as the result of 
maximisation of a simplified version of the CES-UT utility function (see Munk 1998 and 2008), 
( )( )( )0 1 11 2 30 1 1 0 2 3, , ; , , ; ;U c C C x c x xσ σ σ subject to the budget constraint,
0,1,2,3
i i
i
q x
=
∑ . 1 11;1 1 0( , )C x c σ , 
( )21 2 3, , ;C C x x σ  and ( )0 30, ;U C c σ  are CES functions characterised by elasticities of substitution 
11σ , 2σ  and 3σ , respectively. A graphical illustration of the CES-UT utility function used is 
provided in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: The structure of household preferences imbedding the formal sector 
 
u 
3σ  
 
 
 
 
 
    C: Aggregate consumption  00c : Pure leisure 
    2σ  
 
 
     
 
 
 
 
1C Food (Informal sector)   2C   3C  
  11σ   
 
 
 
 
1x : Manufacturing  
1
0c   2x : Cash crop 3x : Food (Formal sector) 
 
The parameters and data used to fully specify the model are provided in Table 1 and Table 2, 
respectively.. 
 
Table 1: Parameter values of the parameterised model 
Elasticity of substitution between pure leisure and consumption, 3σ  0,8 
Elasticity of substitution between composite commodities, 2σ  1 
Elasticity of substitution within the production of food in the informal sector : 11σ  0,1 
The primary factor costs as a share of the purchase of input to produce Food (Informal sector) 3 
Elasticity of substitution within the production of food in the informal sector : 3s  1 
 
The benchmark data set representing the hypothetical situation, where the government’s revenue 
requirement is financed by a lump-sum tax, is provided in the form of supply utilisation accounts for 
the formal part of the economy. The total time endowment is assumed to be 138 of which 24 is used 
for production of Food (Informal Sector)8 and thus 91 for non-productive purposes, leaving 23 (as 
shown in Table 2) to be supplied to the market in the form of Labour. Defining National Income as 
the value added in the production of Food (Formal sector) and Food (Informal sector), and the 
                                                 
8 In the benchmark,  the value of time is assume to be three times the value of the input of Manufacturing  in the 
production of Food (Informal sector) ,i.e. 3x8=24 (see Table 1) 
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Government’s use of Labour, the share of the informal sector in terms of National Income in the 
bench mark is thus 54%9, which seems not to be a particular big figure for what we intend to be a 
represent a prototype developing country. 
 
Table 2: Supply utilisation accounts for the formal economy 
    
Output Intermediate consumption in the formal sector 
 
Net trade 
 
    Manu. Cash c. Food Manu. Cash c. Food Household Gov. RW 
Produced Manu. 0      0,00 0,00 -2,00 -8,00   10,00 
commodities  Cash c.   0    0,00 0,00 0,00 -3,00   3,00 
  Food     20,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 -7,00   -13,00 
Primary 
factor Labour 0  0  0      -18,00 23,00 -5,00   
 
The corresponding matrix of consolidated, compensated demand elasticities is provided in Table 3 
(for how to calculate such elasticities, see Munk 2008). If available for a specific developing country, 
systems of demand elasticities estimated based on flexible functional forms may be compared 
directly with these elasticities. 
 
Table 3: Consolidated compensated price elasticities for the parameterised utility function for the 
chosen parameter values 
ijε  Manufacturing  Cash crop  
 
Food  
(Formal sector) 
Labour 
 
  
Manufacturing  -0,239 0,032 0,075 0,131 
  
Cash crop 0,086 -0,968 0,075 0,806 
  
Food 0,086 0,032 -0,925 0,806 
 
Labour -0,046 -0,105 -0,245 0,396 
Note: The elasticities have been calculated based on the parameters specified in Table 1 and the benchmark dataset 
specified in Table 2 
 
For reference, we notice that the compensated price elasticity of the untaxed use of the primary factor 
in the household sector with respect to the demand for Manufacturing at 0,131 is smaller than with 
respect to the demand for Cash crop and Food (Formal sector), both equal to 0,806; and that the 
compensated elasticities of demand for Manufacturing and Cash crop with respect to the price of the 
export good, Food (Formal sector), are the same, both equal to 0,075. 
We assume that the government considers four different tax structures: 
1Ξ : Only VAT at uniform rate, 
2Ξ : No restrictions on the set of feasible tax instruments, 
3Ξ : VAT at uniform rate and border taxes, and  
4Ξ : Only border taxes; 
 
                                                 
9 0.54=24/(24+23) 
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The corresponding optimal tax systems, *jτ , 1, 2,3, 4j =  calculated based on the assumption that 
taxation does not involve administrative costs are provided in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Optimal tax-tariff systems and administrative costs  
 
Optimal tax-tariff system  
1 1∈Ξτ  *2 2∈Ξτ  *3 3∈Ξτ  
 
*4 4∈Ξτ  
Domestic tax rates        
 Manufacturing  1t  0,32 0,45 0,19 0,00 
 Cash crop 2t  0,32 0,15 0,19 0,00 
 Food (Formal sector) 3t  0,32 0,15 0,19 0,00 
 Labour 0t  
 
0,00 
 
0,00 
 
0,00 
 
0,00 
Border tax rates      
 Manufacturing good 1
Wt  0.00 0.00 0,18 0,52 
 Cash crop 2
Wt  0.00 0.00 0,00 0,19 
 Food (Formal sector) 3
Wt  0.00 0.00 0,00 0,00 
Factor income ( formal sector)  
 
20,67 21,48 20,80 20,91 
EV compared with 1 1∈Ξτ  (as share
of benchmark factor income in the 
formal sector)  
0 
 
0,58% 
 
0,43% 
 
-0,31% 
 
 
For 1Ξ , which serve as benchmark for the comparisons of the maximum social welfare achievable 
under the different tax-tariff regimes, the uniform rate of the VAT required to finance the 
government’s revenue requirement of 5, is 32%. 
For 2Ξ , where there are no restrictions on the government’s use of commodity tax instruments, as a 
matter of normalisation without loss of generality, we assume the export of Food (Formal sector) 
and the supply of Labour to the market to be untaxed. The optimal tax system involves production 
efficiency and hence =0, =1,2,3i it  and 
W =0t . The optimal differentiation of commodity tax rates 
represents a trade-off between the objective of encouraging the supply of labour to the formal sector, 
and the objective of not distorting the consumer prices of produced commodities (cf. Munk 2008). 
As Manufacturing is complementary with the (untaxed) use of the primary factor in the informal 
sector (see Table 3), the optimal tax on the consumption of Manufacturing is thus taxed at the 
relatively high rate of 45%, whereas the consumption of Cash crop and Food (Formal sector) is only 
taxed at 15%. 
For 3Ξ , where the government’s revenue requirement is financed by a VAT at a uniform rate 
supplemented by border taxes, production efficiency is in general not desirable. We can here as for 
2Ξ as a matter of normalisation without loss of generality assume the export of Food (Formal sector) 
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untaxed. The optimal tax system now involves a three way trade-off between the same two objectives 
as in the case of 2Ξ , and in addition the objective of limiting the distortion of the input price of 
Manufacturing in the production of Food (Formal sector) (cf. Munk 2004). The optimal solution 
involves a VAT at a uniform rate of 19% supplemented by a tariff on the imports of Manufacturing 
of 18%. Because of the objective of limiting the distortion of inputs in the production of Food 
(Informal sector) the price wedge between the consumer price and the world market prices, reflecting 
the combined effect of the VAT at uniform rate and the tariff, is at 40%10 lower than the VAT rate 
for Manufacturing for optimal tax system *2 2∈Ξτ which is 45%. 
For 4Ξ , where the government’s revenue requirement is financed only by border taxes, we can as for  
2Ξ  and 3Ξ , as a matter of normalisation without loss of generality assume the exports of Food 
(Formal Sector) as untaxed. The optimal solution involves differentiation of tariff rates motivated by 
the following objectives (cf. Munk and Rasmussen 2005): the two objective which determine the 
optimal tax system in a closed economy 
- to encourage the supply of labour to the formal sector ( Objective 1), and  
- not to distort the consumer prices of produced commodities (Objective 2) 
and in addition the objective  
- to encourage the export of Food (Objective 3)11 
Objective 2 draws, as in the case of 3Ξ , in the direction of a relatively high tariff on the imports of 
Manufacturing. Objective 3 suggests on the one hand, that it is desirable to strive for a relatively high 
tariff on the imports of commodities which in household consumption is complementary with the 
consumption of Food (Formal sector), the export good, and on the other hand, that a relatively low 
tariff on Manufacturing is desirable as it is used as intermediate inputs in the production of 
Food(Formal sector). With the current parameterisation we have assumed additive separability in 
consumption between the three produced commodities. This implies that that Manufacturing and 
Food (Formal sector) are equally complementary with the consumption of Food (Formal sector) 
(see Table 3, 13 23 0.075ε ε= = ). It is thus not possible by differentiation of tariff rates to discourage 
the household consumption of Food (Formal sector), however this is an artefact of the 
parameterisation of the model12. A relative low tariff on Manufacturing will thus encourage the 
production, and thus the export of Food (Formal sector). Objective 2 of encouraging the supply of 
labour to the market dominates Objective 3 of encouraging the exports of Food (Formal sector) with 
the result that the optimal tariff on the imports of Manufacturing at 52% is considerably higher than 
                                                 
10 0,40 = (1+0,18)x(1+0,19) - 1 
11For border taxes to raise revenue to the government the tax system *4τ  must discouraged the exports of Food (Formal 
sector). Objective 3 does not apply in the case of 3Ξ  since under this tax structure the justification for the use of border 
taxes is not to raise government revenue directly, but to encourage the supply of labour to the market. 
12 The CGE model may easily be modified to represent this possibility. 
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the tariff on Cash Crop at 19%. This result contrasts with results calculated using of standard CGE 
models, as for example Dahl et al. (1994) and Mitra (1992), where the welfare loss caused by 
imposing a uniform tariff rather than the optimal tariff is negligible. The difference in results may be 
explained by the fact that standard CGE models impose separability between household consumption 
of produced commodities, and sometimes even quite unrealistically that the supply of labour is fixed, 
whereas the CES-UT specification used in the present model allows for differences in the degree of 
complementarity with the use of the primary factor in the informal sector. It seems hardly realistic, in 
particular in developing countries, to assume additive separability between consumption of different 
commodities and the use of the primary factor in the informal sector. One would therefore expect a 
non-proportional tariff structure to represent the optimal solution in practise, even when based as 
here only on efficiency considerations13. Our simulation results are consistent with this insight. We 
therefore at this point for the reasons elaborated in Munk and Rasmussen (2005) reach a different 
conclusion than Hatta and Ogawa (2007) who suggest that in practice the optimal tariff structure will 
be close to proportionality. 
To give an idea of the size of administrative costs required to balance the benefits in terms of the 
resource allocation of the different tax structures, we calculate the savings in administrative costs 
required to make the optimal tax systems *jτ , 2,3, 4j =  equivalent in welfare terms to *1τ . These 
results are reported in Table 5. 14 
 
Table 5: Administrative costs making * *1~iτ τ  
Optimal tax-tariff system 
 
1 1∈Ξτ *2 2∈Ξτ  *3 3∈Ξτ  
 
*4 4∈Ξτ
Required saving of administrative costs as share of
factor income in formal sector in benchmark 
 
0 0,48% 0,29% -0,35% 
 
The increase in administrative costs associated with 2Ξ  compared with 1Ξ  which makes *2τ  
equivalent to *1τ  in welfare terms, is 0.48% of the factor income in the formal sector. The increase in 
administrative costs associated with 3Ξ  which makes *3τ  equivalent to *1τ  is 0.29%, whereas the 
administrative costs associated with 4Ξ need to be at least 0.35% lower to make *4τ equivalent to *1τ . 
Therefore, border taxes are desirable as an alternative or as a supplement to a VAT system if 
compared with the administrative costs associated with 1Ξ  the administrative costs associated with 
                                                 
13 Taking distributional aspects into account naturally provides an additional reason for non-proportionality. For more 
detailed arguments with respect to this point, see Emran and Stiglitz (2007). 
14  The figures of course differ from the EVs reported in Table 4 , as they have been calculated taking the administrative 
costs of taxation into account. 
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2Ξ  are more than 0.48% greater, and either 1) those associated with 3Ξ  less than 0.29% more costly, 
or 2) those associated with 4Ξ  at least 0.35% less costly than those associated with 1Ξ .  
The cost of financing the government’s revenue requirement by border taxes rather than domestic 
taxes increases progressively with the government’s revenue requirements. If for example the share 
of the government’s requirement increases from 5 (see Table 2) to 10, the saving in administrative 
costs needed to finance the government’s revenue requirement solely by border taxes rather than by a 
VAT at uniform rate increases more than threefold from 0.35% to 1.15% of the factor income in the 
formal sector.15 
The model simulations thus highlights that one cannot a priori exclude that border taxes are desirable 
based only on theoretical considerations. The important factors for whether or not free trade is 
desirable  are 1) the relative size of the informal sector, 2) the differences in complementarity with 
the untaxed use of primary factors in the informal sector of different commodities, 3) the costs 
associated with tax administration, and 4) the size of the government resource requirement as a share 
of GNP. 
As knowledge about these aspects are largely insufficient to settled the disagreement between Stiglitz 
and the Bretton-Woods sister organisations on whether the use of border taxes is desirable in 
developing countries, there is clearly a need for empirical research on the administrative costs 
associated with different tax structures and on the structure of the economy (in our model represented 
by the benchmark data set and the value of the elasticities of substitution). 
 
5. Summary and concluding remarks 
 
We have considered Stiglitz’ (2003) claim that in developing countries border taxes are a better 
instrument to raise government revenue than a VAT. We have for this purpose specified a 
parameterised model where the informal sector is represented by a CES-UT utility function, where 
production in the informal sector is assumed to generate an untaxed profit to the household, and 
where different tax structures are associated with different administrative costs. We have shown that 
Keen’s partial equilibrium model is a special case of this model. His analysis therefore amounts to 
restating the Diamond-Mirrlees efficiency theorem for this special case. Keen is thus right that a 
large informal sector in itself does not provide an argument against free trade.  
However, as was already many years ago pointed out by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), but which has 
largely been neglected, presumably as analytically and ideologically inconvenient, the Diamond-
                                                 
15 Just with reference to the increasing size of the government’s share of consumption in GNP, Kimbrough and Gardner 
(1992) explain why the importance of tariff revenue in the US has diminished over time. The present model may thus 
also be used to illustrate explain why because the size of government is smaller in developing countries the use of tariffs 
to raise government revenue is more attractive than in developed countries. 
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Mirrlees (1971) efficiency theorem does not apply when all commodities cannot be taxed at no cost. 
We have illustrated this insight using a parameterised model and a set of data and parameter values 
representing a prototype developing country with a large informal sector resulting in a plausible 
matrix of compensated demand elasticities. We have produced simulation results which illustrate that 
when taxation is associated with administrative costs, whether border taxes are desirable or not 
depends critically on the size of informal sector, as has been pointed out by Emran and Stiglitz 
(2005, 2007). When a VAT at uniform rates is the only source of domestic taxation, the 
complementarity between the consumption of the traded goods and the use of the primary factor in 
the informal sector plays an import role for whether, based on efficiency considerations, it is 
desirable to supplement a VAT with border taxes. In the case where border taxes are the only source 
of government revenue, the desire to discourageof the consumption of the export good and the to 
encourage its production also influence the optimal tax structure, as identified in Munk and 
Rasmussen (2005). Furthermore, contrary to what has been suggested in the literature, a proportional 
tariff structure is unlikely to be optimal in practice. When distributional considerations, which for 
reasons of exposition we have ignored in this paper, are taken into account it becomes even more 
unlikely that the optimal tariff system used in developing countries to maximise social welfare 
should be proportional. 
The simulation results have highlighted that the question of whether border taxes are desirable or not 
is complex depending on a number of factors which can only be assessed based on empirical 
evidence which is difficult to obtain. Evidence on the distortionary and administrative costs of 
various tax arrangements is essential in order for a given country at a given point in time to identify 
the tax-tariff system which is optimal for that country given its social objectives. 
As pointed out by Keen (2006), evidence suggests that the introduction of VAT over time may serve 
as a catalyst for reduction in the costs of tax administration, and thus facilitate the adoption of free 
trade. It is therefore important that recommendations for VAT are made not only with reference to 
text book models which ignore administrative costs as has often been the case, as this may result in 
the recommendations be seen as based on ideology, rather than facts. 
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Annex: The partial equilibrium model employed by Keen 
 
The purpose of this Annex is to detail the assertion that the partial equilibrium model employed by Keen 
(2006), which underpins his 2006 presidential address to the IIPF congress (Keen 2007), may be seen as a 
special case of the general equilibrium model we have specified in Section 2 of the main paper. 
Keen considers an economy with an informal and formal sector, but, as his analysis is conducted within a 
partial equilibrium framework, he does not explicitly represent the use of the primary factor in neither the 
informal sector nor the formal sector and represents only two commodities. However, assuming that the first 
commodity corresponds to Manufacturing and the second to Food (Formal sector), Keen’s model may be 
interpreted as a special case of our model, explicitly representing Manufacturing imports and the domestic 
production of Food (Formal sector), as well as the competing production of Food (Informal sector). Keen 
(2006) assumes the production of Food (Informal sector), ( 1C  in our notation and Y in Keen’s notation), to 
be a perfect substitute for Food (Formal sector), ( 3y  in our notation and y in Keen’s notation), whereas in 
our model Food (Formal sector) and Food (Informal sector) are imperfect substitutes. However, this is not 
an important difference as Keen’s model at this point may be interpreted as a limiting case of our model. 
The consumer price of manufacturing, 1q  in our notation, is in Keen’s notation 1
M W
V
P T T
T
ρ ⎛ ⎞+ +≡ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
 with P  
being the world market price of Manufacturing, and M WT T  the tariff rate and the VAT rate, respectively, 
applied to Manufacturing imports (the latter, WT , by Keen called a withholding tax), and VT  the VAT rate 
applied to sales of domestically produced goods. When ρ VT = WT , such that the tax-inclusive import price of 
Manufacturing faced by informal producers is ρ = MP T+ , this corresponds to a VAT at uniform rate, (in our 
notation to a consumer tax vector, ( )1 2 3,t ,t t , where ( ) /i i it p p T+ = , 1, 2,3i = ). 
The price of Food (Formal sector), ( 3q  in our notation, Q  plus the VAT rate in his notation), is in Keen’s 
model equal to the price of Food (Informal sector), (in our notation ( )
1
1
1 0 1 1, ,CQ G q q C=  ). The cost function 
for the production of Food (Formal sector), is in Keen’s notation ( ),C Yρ , in our notation ( )3 31 3, ;0c p p s y . 
Notice that both in the model employed in Munk (2004) and in this paper, the consumption in the informal 
sector of commodities produced in the formal sector are purchased at consumer prices. This is in contrast to 
what is assumed in Piggott and Whalley (2001) and in Stiglitz and Emran (2005). However, in the model 
used in Munk (2004), contrary to in the present one, there are no intermediate inputs in formal sector 
production. A VAT is therefore in Munk (2004) similar to a consumption tax system. 
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